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I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of The Natural, the main character, Roy Hobbs, has the
chance to win the pennant for his baseball team, the Knights.1  Prior
to reaching the big game, Hobbs had established himself as a great
baseball player by consistently hitting well.2  Many onlookers attrib-
uted Hobbs’s success to a bat called “Wonderboy,” which he had made
from a tree that had been split in half by a bolt of lighting.3  Unfortu-
nately, at the big game, Hobbs struck out on his first two at bats.4  His
third time at bat, however, with the game on the line, Hobbs’s luck
turned around.  His first swing resulted in a foul ball that broke the
glass of the announcer’s box.5  On his second swing, he hit a ball that
looked to be a home run but instead veered off as a foul.6  On his way
back to the plate, Hobbs noticed that “Wonderboy” had split in half
from the impact of the baseball.7  Devastated, Hobbs turned to his
batboy, Bobby Savoy.8  Bobby returned from the dugout with a bat he
had made with Hobbs called the “Savoy Special.”9  Using the “Savoy
Special,” Hobbs knocked the next pitch out of the park high enough to
shatter the lights that illuminated the stadium.10
1. THE NATURAL (Tri-Star Pictures 1984).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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Justice Breyer argued in his majority opinion in United States v.
Home Concrete & Supply, LLC11 that relying on a single word in a
statute would be like “hoping that a new batboy will change the out-
come of the World Series.”12  He was referring to the IRS’s argument
that, by leaving the word “amount” in a statute regarding the statute
of limitations in tax cases, Congress intended for a certain group of
taxpayers to be subject to a longer statute of limitations than the typi-
cal three years that is allowed for normal tax matters.13  However,
just as Hobbs managed to win the big game with the help of his
batboy, the Supreme Court should defer to its own batboy, the IRS,
when determining the meaning of a statute the Court has not previ-
ously interpreted.
Generally speaking, taxpayers may legally seek to reduce their tax
liability by creating the appearance of a financial loss.14  This practice
is referred to as a “tax shelter” and is a strategy that is often promoted
in the business world.15  Although most tax shelters, such as transfer-
ring money to personal retirement accounts, are permissible,16 some
have been outlawed.17  The Bond Option Sales Strategy (Son of BOSS)
is one such shelter.18  A Son of BOSS shelter generally refers to a
transaction in which a taxpayer artificially inflates his or her basis in
a piece of property in order to show a loss in the subsequent sale of
such property.19  President Barack Obama recently brought more at-
tention to Son of BOSS tax shelters by issuing a press release imply-
ing that Mitt Romney was involved in various Son of BOSS schemes
while on the board of Marriott International.20
11. 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
12. Id. at 1842.
13. Id.
14. Derek B. Wagner, Who’s the (Son of) BOSS?: The Struggle Between the Federal
Circuit and Treasury to Define “Omits from Gross Income” in Son of BOSS Tax
Shelters and Other Overstatement-of-Basis Tax Cases, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 45, 45
(2011).
15. Id. “[A] tax shelter is any transaction or investment entered into solely for the
purpose of reducing the investor’s tax liability by creating the appearance of a
financial loss, when, in fact, the taxpayer has retained dominion and control over
the assets.” Id.
16. See Chaka Fattah, Déjà Vu All Over Again: Reexamining Fundamental Tax Re-
form and Evaluating the Feasibility of a Transaction Tax in the 111th Congress,
47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 327, 330 (2010).
17. Wagner, supra note 14, at 45.
18. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (prohibiting deductions for losses gen-
erated by Son of BOSS transactions).
19. See, e.g., Kornman & Assocs. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443, 446 n.2 (5th Cir.
2008).
20. Callum Borchers, President Obama’s Campaign Repeats Call for More Mitt Rom-
ney Tax Returns, Citing Tax Shelter Used by Marriott When Romney Was on
Board, BOSTON.COM (Aug. 9, 2012, 1:53 PM), http://www.boston.com/politi
calintelligence/2012/08/09/president-obama-campaign-repeats-call-for-more-mitt-
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In 2000, the IRS effectively prohibited Son of BOSS tax shelters by
enacting Notice 2000-44.21  This notice provides examples of partner-
ship transactions that must be reported to the IRS.22  If partnerships
do not report these transactions, known as “listed transactions,” the
partnerships “may be subject to the penalty under § 6707(a) and to the
penalty under § 6708(a).”23  Although it is clear that the use of Son of
BOSS tax shelters is illegal, there remains a question of whether the
IRS has longer than the typical three-year statute of limitations to
prosecute a taxpayer who takes advantage of a Son of BOSS tax
shelter.24
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether the stat-
ute of limitations is extended for Son of BOSS cases in Colony, Inc. v.
Commissioner.25  In Colony, the Court determined that a Son of BOSS
transaction did not constitute an omission of income; therefore, the
IRS only had three years to prosecute such cases.26  The Court in Col-
ony based its decision on language from § 275(c), which Congress en-
acted as part of the 1939 version of the Internal Revenue Code to
prevent taxpayers from omitting income from their tax returns.27  Un-
fortunately, this left the question of whether § 6501, the successor
statute to § 275(c), should also be read to prohibit the IRS from prose-
cuting Son of BOSS transactions after the three-year statute of
limitations.28
romney-tax-returns-citing-tax-shelter-used-marriott-when-romney-was-board/
oXkbpYDEbE1kdJvyGgGzSJ/story.html.
21. “[A] loss is allowable as a deduction for federal income tax purposes only if it is
bona fide and reflects actual economic consequences.”  I.R.S. Notice 2000-44,
2000-2 C.B. 255 (citing ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 252 (3d Cir. 1998)).
22. Id. at 2–5.
23. Id. at 7. See also I.R.C. § 6707(b)(2) (2006) (providing a fine of $200,000 or up to
75 percent of any gross income derived from a listed transaction that a taxpayer
fails to report); I.R.C. § 6708 (a)(1) (2004) (imposing a fine of $10,000 per day for
taxpayers who fail to provide a list of advisees as required under I.R.C. § 6112(a)
within twenty days of carrying out a reportable transaction).
24. See, e.g., Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (holding that the IRS has six years to file a claim), vacated, 132 S. Ct.
2120 (2012); Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2011); Beard v.
Comm’r, 633 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012); Salman
Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that the IRS
only has three years to file a claim); Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Comm’r,
568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2009).
25. 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
26. Id. at 38.
27. Id. at 37. See I.R.C. § 275(c) (1939).
28. Congress adopted § 6501 into the Internal Revenue Code in 1954, nearly four
years before the Supreme Court decided Colony.  However, because the Supreme
Court referred to § 6501 in the Colony decision, many courts determined that the
Court interpreted both § 275(c) and § 6501 in the Colony case. Id. at 37 (“[T]he
conclusion we reach is in harmony with the unambiguous language of
§ 6501(e)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.”).
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The IRS issued a regulation interpreting § 6501 to mean the IRS
could prosecute taxpayers for Son of BOSS transactions after the typi-
cal three-year statute of limitations.29  However, the Court in United
States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC30 refused to recognize the reg-
ulation and instead held that the Court in Colony had already inter-
preted § 6501; therefore, there was no more room for the IRS to
interpret the statute.31  By extension, the Court in Home Concrete
held that the IRS should only be allowed three years to prosecute a
taxpayer who unlawfully takes advantage of a Son of BOSS tax
shelter.32
This Note argues the Court in Colony did not interpret § 6501 re-
garding Son of BOSS shelters,33 and therefore, the IRS was free to
issue its own interpretation of the statute before the Home Concrete
decision.34  Furthermore, the Home Concrete Court should have relied
on the IRS’s interpretation of the statute, and that interpretation
should now be the governing authority regarding Son of BOSS
shelters.35
This Note analyzes two issues presented in the Home Concrete de-
cision: First, it examines whether the language “omits from gross in-
come” as found in I.R.C. § 6501(e) includes Son of BOSS shelters.
Second, it discusses whether the Court should grant deference to the
IRS regarding treasury regulations it releases during pending litiga-
tion.  Part II of this Note gives the history and background of the dis-
pute regarding the correct statute of limitations on Son of BOSS tax
shelters.  Part III describes the Home Concrete case.  Finally, Part IV
explains why courts should grant an extended statute of limitations
for overstatement of basis cases and why courts should give deference
to IRS regulations even if they are proposed while the IRS is a party in
pending litigation.
29. Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-1 (2011).
30. 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
31. Id. at 1842 (2012) (“[A] ‘court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an
agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior
court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of
the statute.’” (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n. v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005))).
32. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1841 (reasoning the Supreme Court in Colony re-
solved the dispute over the statute of limitations regarding Son of BOSS
shelters).
33. I.R.C. § 6501(e) (2006).
34. See infra subsection IV.A.1.
35. See infra section IV.B.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Section 275(c) of the 1934 Revenue Act
When Congress enacted § 275(c) as part of the Revenue Act of
1934, it opened the floodgates for litigation regarding the proper stat-
ute of limitations for overstatement of basis cases.36  Section 275(c)
states in pertinent part:
If the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein
which is in excess of 25 per centum of the amount of gross income stated in the
return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of
such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within 5 years after
the return was filed.37
Congress incorporated virtually the same language into the 1939 In-
ternal Revenue Code, which later became the statute at issue in
Colony.38
Gross income includes the “[t]otal income from all sources before
deductions, exemptions, or other tax reductions.”39  A taxpayer’s basis
is “the total cost of acquiring [an] asset, including the purchase price
plus commissions and other related expenses, less depreciation and
other adjustments.”40  In a Son of BOSS transaction, a taxpayer in-
flates the basis he or she has in a piece of property, which effectively
reduces the amount of income the taxpayer receives on paper for the
transaction.41
Almost immediately after Congress created § 275(c), courts began
to question whether the phrase “omits from gross income” included
the inflation of basis.42  In Reis v. Commissioner43 the Sixth Circuit
determined that because the taxpayer had adopted an incorrect basis
36. See, e.g., Goodenow v. Comm’r, 238 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1956) (three-year statute
of limitations); Uptegrove Lumber Co. v. Comm’r, 204 F.2d 570, 573 (3d Cir.
1953) (three-year statute of limitations); Reis v. Comm’r, 142 F.2d 900, 903 (6th
Cir. 1944) (five-year statute of limitations); Estate of Gibbs v. Comm’r, 21 T.C.
443, 447 (1954) (five-year statute of limitations).
37. I.R.C. § 275(c) (1934) (emphasis added).  Section 276(a) extends this limitations
period from five years to an unlimited amount of time if a taxpayer submits a
false or fraudulent return in an attempt to evade taxation.  I.R.C. § 276(a) (1939);
I.R.C. § 6501(c) (2006).  Although inflating basis to achieve a lower tax liability is
improper under the current tax code, it does not fall under the false or fraudulent
language of § 276(a). See I.R.C. § 276(a).
38. I.R.C. § 275(c) (1939).
39. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 831 (9th ed. 2009).  See also I.R.C. § 61 (2006) (describ-
ing how to calculate gross income).
40. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 171 (9th ed. 2009).
41. Sebastian Watt, Comment, Abolishing the Shelter of Ambiguity: A New Frame-
work for Treasury Regulation Deference Clarifying Chevron and Brand X, 117
PENN ST. L. REV. 617, 626 (2012) (citing Wagner, supra note 14, at 46–48).
42. See, e.g., Goodenow v. Comm’r., 238 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1956); Uptegrove Lum-
ber Co. v. Comm’r, 204 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1953); Reis v. Comm’r, 142 F.2d 900, 903
(6th Cir. 1944); Estate of Gibbs v. Comm’r, 21 T.C. 443 (1954).
43. 142 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1944).
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in his property, he illegally omitted from his tax return an amount
totaling over 25 percent of his income.44  The Sixth Circuit determined
the incorrect basis was an omission from gross income and granted the
IRS up to five years to assess a penalty.45  The tax court similarly
interpreted the phrase “omits from gross income” to include an infla-
tion of basis.46  The tax court and Sixth Circuit both reasoned that,
had the taxpayers not improperly increased the basis in their prop-
erty, they would have been required to include the excess amount in
gross income.47  Because the excluded amount exceeded 25 percent of
the taxpayers’ gross income, the courts held that each transaction was
an omission from gross income and that the five-year statute of limita-
tions applied.48
A number of courts, however, disagreed with the interpretation of
the Sixth Circuit and the tax court.49  The Third Circuit in Uptegrove
Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, for example, did not interpret the
phrase “omits from gross income” to include an inflation of basis.50
The court analyzed the legislative history behind § 275(c) and deter-
mined the five-year exception only applied “where the taxpayer had
failed to make a return of some taxable gain.”51  The Third Circuit did
not include an increase in basis under that distinction.52  The
Uptegrove court reasoned that an inflation of basis does not constitute
an omission of gross income because Congress gave no indication in
the legislative history of § 275(c) that an omission from gross income
includes anything other than failing to include some receipt or
accrual.53
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit held that overstatement of deduc-
tions for cost basis of assets sold, resulting in insufficient gross income
on return, did not constitute “omission from gross income” for pur-
poses of the extended statute of limitations provision in § 275(c).54
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that improper calculations of gross in-
come do not rise to the level of an omission Congress sought to prevent
44. Id. at 903. See also Ketcham v. Comm’r, 142 F.2d 996, 997 (2d Cir. 1944) (holding
that the five-year statute of limitations applies for an omission of gross income
involving the increase of basis).
45. Reis, 142 F.2d at 903.
46. See, e.g., Estate of Gibbs v. Comm’r, 21 T.C. 443 (1954); Am. Liberty Oil Co. v.
Comm’r, 1 T.C. 386 (1942).
47. Reis, 142 F.2d at 902; Ketcham, 142 F.2d at 997; Gibbs, 21 T.C. at 447.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Goodenow v. Comm’r., 238 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1956); Uptegrove Lum-
ber Co. v. Comm’r, 204 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1953).
50. Uptegrove, 204 F.2d at 572
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Goodenow, 238 F.2d at 22.
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by enacting § 275(c).55  Other courts have followed a course similar to
the Third and Eighth Circuits, holding that an increase in basis does
not constitute an omission from gross income.56
The Supreme Court sought to settle this circuit split in Colony, Inc.
v. Commissioner.57  In Colony, the IRS assessed deficiencies in the
taxpayer’s income based on “certain lots of land . . . [upon which the
taxpayer] overstated the ‘basis’ . . . by erroneously including in their
cost certain unallowable items of development expense.”58  The Court,
recognizing that § 275(c) was ambiguous,59 looked to the legislative
history behind the statute and concluded that it only supported a defi-
nition of “omit” that included “some income receipt or accrual in [the
taxpayer’s] computation of gross income,” but this definition did not
include “errors in [that] computation arising from other causes.”60
The Court continued its discussion by citing various statements from
Congress that supported its conclusion regarding § 275(c).61  In dic-
tum, the Court muddied the waters for the statute of limitations de-
bate by saying that the “conclusion [it] reached [was] in harmony with
the unambiguous language of § 6501(e)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.”62  As discussed below,63 this conclusion was erroneous
because the only legislative history discussed in the Colony opinion
was that of § 275(c) and not that of § 6501.  Although § 6501 had been
enacted by the time of the Colony decision, it was not in place at the
time the taxpayer filed his return in Colony, thereby forcing the Court
to rely on § 275.64
B. The Court in Colony Failed to Prevent Future Circuit
Splits Regarding § 6501 of the 1954 Version of the
Modern Tax Code
Because Colony does not directly address the 1954 Tax Code’s ver-
sion of § 275(c), courts began to wrestle with whether Colony was con-
trolling precedent for § 6501 “omissions from gross income.”65  Section
6501 states in relevant part:
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Slaff v. Comm’r, 220 F.2d 65, 68 (9th Cir. 1955) (“How such a plain
statement can be construed as an omission is difficult for us to understand under
the circumstances.”).
57. 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
58. Id. at 30.
59. Id. at 33 (“[I]t cannot be said that the language is unambiguous.”).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 33–36.
62. Id. at 37.
63. See infra section II.B.
64. Colony, Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28, 32 (1958).
65. See, e.g., Salman Ranch v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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If the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount properly includible
therein which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in
the return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection
of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within 6 years after
the return was filed.  For the purposes of this subparagraph—
(i) In the case of a trade or business, the term “gross income” means the
total of the amounts received or accrued from the sale of goods or ser-
vices (if such amounts are required to be shown on the return) prior to
diminution by the cost of such sales or services; and
(ii) In determining the amount omitted from gross income, there shall
not be taken into account any amount which is omitted from gross in-
come stated in the return if such amount is disclosed in the return, or in
a statement attached to the return, in a manner adequate to apprise the
Secretary or his delegate of the nature and amount of such item.66
Although the language § 6501 is very similar to that of § 275(c), it in-
cludes a number of key changes and additions.  More specifically,
§ 6501 now includes subparagraph (i), which provides a different defi-
nition of “gross income;” and subparagraph (ii), which provides a safe
haven for taxpayers who warn the IRS about possible overstatements
of basis.  Additionally, § 6501(e)(2) uses the word “item” as opposed to
“amount,” and § 6501 extended the statute of limitations from five to
six years.  In Salman Ranch v. United States,67 the IRS pointed out
many of these changes to bolster its claim that Congress intended the
six-year statute of limitations to apply in cases involving § 6501.68
First, the IRS noted that Congress added subparagraph (i) to the
statute.69  Subparagraph (i) gives a different definition for the term
“gross income” for cases where a trade or business is involved.70  Ac-
cording to the IRS, subparagraph (i) “gross income” only includes the
amounts received from a sale instead of the difference between the
amount received and the taxpayer’s basis in a piece of property.71  The
IRS argued that applying that definition of “gross income” outside the
trade or business context would make subparagraph (i) superfluous to
the opening paragraph of § 6501(e)(1)(A).72  Therefore, the IRS deter-
mined that the term “gross income” in § 6501(e)(1)(A) should follow a
66. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) (1954) (emphasis added).  Section 6229(c)(2) includes virtu-
ally identical language to § 6501 but directs its language more specifically to
partnerships.  I.R.C. § 6229(c)(2) (1983) (“If any partnership omits from gross in-
come an amount properly includible therein which is in excess of 25 percent of the
amount of gross income stated in its return, subsection (a) shall be applied by
substituting ‘6 years’ for ‘3 years.’”). See also Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail,
LLC v. Comm’r, 650 F.3d 691, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120
(2012) (questioning whether § 6229 has a different meaning than § 6501 in over-
statement of basis cases but leaving the issue open for another court to resolve).
67. 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1371.
70. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
71. Salman, 573 F.3d at 1371.
72. Id.  See also Platt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 48, 58 (1878) (“[A] legislature is
presumed to have used no superfluous words.”).
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more general definition of gross income, which only includes the
amount retained after subtracting basis from receipts.73
Next, the IRS addressed the addition of subparagraph (ii) to
§ 6501.  Subparagraph (ii) gives a safe haven to taxpayers for ade-
quately apprising the Secretary of Treasury of the amount omitted
from income.74  The IRS argued that, by adding this safe haven, Con-
gress effectively “eliminated the Supreme Court’s primary justifica-
tion for its ruling in Colony.”75  The Court’s primary justification for
its decision in Colony was that disclosing an inflation of basis is
enough of a disclosure to avoid putting the IRS “at a special disadvan-
tage in detecting errors.”76  Therefore, if a taxpayer discloses an infla-
tion of basis, the IRS should not be granted an extended statute of
limitations.77  In § 6501 the safe haven requires the taxpayer to iden-
tify the specific amount omitted to avoid an extended statute of limita-
tions.78  Under § 6501 the IRS claimed that “[subparagraph (ii)]
render[ed] moot the Court’s rationale for stating that an overstated
basis does not constitute an omission of gross income.”79
Finally, the IRS argued that § 6501 differs from § 275(c) by the ad-
dition of § 6501(e)(2).80  Paragraph (2) provides that “if the taxpayer
omits from the gross estate . . . items includible in such gross es-
tate . . . a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be
begun without assessment, at any time within 6 years.”81  Because
Congress used the term “item” instead of “amount,” the IRS argued
Congress did not intend the six-year statute of limitations to apply
with regard to the estate and gift tax for “differences as to the valua-
tion of property.”82  The IRS instead argued that because the language
in § 6501(e)(1) uses the word “amount” rather than “item,” Congress
intended an omission from gross income to occur “not only when a tax-
payer completely leaves an item of income out of the return, but also
when the taxpayer overstates the basis of an asset.”83
In opposition to the IRS, taxpayers have argued that Colony is
guiding precedent for § 6501 cases and that § 275(c) is substantially
similar to § 6501.84  For example, the plaintiff in Phinney v. Chambers
73. Salman, 573 F.3d at 1371.
74. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) (1954).
75. Salman, 573 F.3d at 1371.
76. Id. (citing Colony, Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28, 36 (1958)).
77. Id.
78. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii).
79. Salman, 573 F.3d at 1372.
80. Id.
81. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(2).
82. Salman, 573 F.3d at 1372.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., CC & F W. Operations Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r, 273 F.3d 402 (1st Cir.
2001); Phinney v. Chambers, 392 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1968).
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argued unsuccessfully that subparagraph (ii) should apply when the
plaintiff at least lists the item with the increased basis on his tax re-
turn.85  Other plaintiffs have argued that Colony should apply based
on Justice Harlan’s reasoning that the additional two-year statute of
limitations was meant to aid the Commissioner when a “return on its
face provide[d] no clue to the existence of the omitted item.”86
Both the government and taxpayers have raised these competing
arguments in a number of federal courts, with varying results.  Some
courts have held that Colony’s reasoning that an overstatement of ba-
sis is not an omission from gross income does not apply to cases involv-
ing § 6501.87  Others found differently.88  The debate continued even
after the IRS attempted to curb the use of Son of BOSS tax shelters in
year 2000 with its I.R.C. Notice 2000-44.89
85. Phinney, 392 F.2d at 683.
86. Colony, Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28, 36 (1958). See also CC & F W. Operations
Ltd. P’ship, 273 F.3d at 408 (ruling against plaintiff who argued that an increase
in basis sufficiently alerts the Commissioner to omitted items).
87. See, e.g., Beard v. Comm’r, 633 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Colony’s holding is
inherently qualified by the facts of the case before the Court, facts which differ
from our case, where the Beards’ omission was not in the course of trade or busi-
ness.”), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012); Cardinal Life Ins. Co. v. United States,
425 F.2d 1328, 1329 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding there is an omission of gross income
if the statement in the return is not “adequate to apprise the government of the
nature and amount of such item.”).
88. See, e.g., Salman, 573 F.3d at 1373 (“We recognize that the Supreme Court in
Colony did not purport to interpret I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A).  In our view, however,
several considerations weigh in favor of extending the Colony interpretation.”);
Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Comm’r, 568 F.3d 767, 771 (9th Cir. 2009) (hold-
ing Colony applied because the language from § 275(c) was virtually identical to
the language in § 6501(e)); CC & F W. Operations Ltd. P’ship, 273 F.3d at 407
(following Colony but clarifying that the “clue test” is a much stiffer test than
most circuits normally apply); Ketchum v. Comm’r, 697 F.2d 466, 473 (2d Cir.
1982) (reasoning that because the taxpayer made adequate disclosure in his re-
turn, the amounts included could not be taken into account in determining an
amount omitted from gross income); Benderoff v. United States, 398 F.2d 132,
136 (8th Cir. 1968) (“The proper test thus appears to be whether the return pro-
vides a clue as to the omitted item.”); Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54922, at *27–28 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2007) (applying the
adequate disclosure test from Colony to determine that the partnership had not
disclosed enough information to limit the statute of limitations to only three
years); George Edward Quick Trust v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 1336, 1347 (1970) (decid-
ing in favor of the taxpayer who provided the Commissioner with enough of a
“clue” to become aware of the existence of an error in the tax return).
89. Compare Beard, 633 F.3d at 620 (“Colony’s holding is inherently qualified by the
facts of the case before the Court, facts which differ from our case, where the
Beards’ omission was not in the course of trade or business.”), vacated, 132 S. Ct.
2099 (2012), with Salman, 573 F.3d at 1373 (“We recognize that the Supreme
Court in Colony did not purport to interpret I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A).”).
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C. Level of Deference to Give IRS Regulations Issued
During Pending Litigation
The debate between circuits over whether and how to apply Colony
to inflated basis cases effectively ended with the Supreme Court’s re-
cent decision to apply Colony to overstatement of basis cases in United
States v. Home Concrete & Supply.90  Although the Supreme Court
resolved the issue of whether Colony applies to overstatement of basis
cases, albeit incorrectly,91 courts might find it difficult to determine
when and how to apply IRS regulations to similar cases in the future.
Between 2009 and 2010, the few courts relying on Colony as prece-
dent had determined the extended statute of limitations did not apply
to Son of BOSS cases.92  While a number of similar cases were waiting
to go up on appeal, the IRS issued Temporary Treasury Regulation
§ 301.6501(e)-1T(b).93  On December 14, 2010, after the notice and
comment period, the regulation was made final.94  The regulation “de-
fine[s] ‘omission from gross income’ as including ‘an understated
amount of gross income resulting from an overstatement . . . of basis
for purposes of sections 6501(e)(1)(A) and 6229(c)(2).’ ”95  The regula-
tion essentially limited Colony’s holding to trade or business contexts
and ensured that the six-year statute of limitations would apply in all
Son of BOSS cases.
Chevron v. NRDC96 gives the framework for determining whether
a court should grant deference to an agency regulation.97  When con-
fronted with the question of whether to grant deference to a particular
regulation, a court must ask first “whether Congress has directly spo-
ken to the precise question at issue.”98  If the statute is clear as to
Congress’s intent, the court should apply Congress’s interpretation of
the statute, and that will typically be the end of the matter.99  How-
ever, if Congress did not speak directly to the precise question at is-
sue, the court should determine “whether the agency’s [interpretation
of the statute] is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”100
90. 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
91. See infra section IV.A.
92. See, e.g., Burks v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109876 (N.D. Tex. June
13, 2008), rev’d, 633 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2011); Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail,
LLC v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 211 (2010), rev’d, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated,
132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012).
93. Intermountain Ins. Serv., 650 F.3d at 700.
94. Burks, 633 F.3d at 359.
95. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-1(a)(1)(iii) (2010)).
96. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 842.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 843.
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The Court provided clarification in National Cable & Telecommu-
nications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Service101 about how to apply
Chevron in a case where a previous court has already interpreted an
ambiguous statute before an agency issues a regulation.102  “A court’s
prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision
holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the
statute.”103  This reading is justified by the idea that when Congress
leaves an ambiguity in a statute, it means for the agency to correct
that ambiguity when it implements regulations that flow there-
from.104  The Court in Home Concrete conceded that the Court in Col-
ony determined § 275(c) was ambiguous.105  However, instead of
granting the agency deference, as Brand X would have required for
normal pre-Chevron decisions, the Home Concrete Court added an-
other stipulation to Chevron.  According to the Court in Home Con-
crete, if a pre-Chevron Court decision is based on an ambiguous
statute, instead of granting agency discretion as Chevron requires, a
deciding court must ask whether Congress wanted “the particular am-
biguity in question” to be resolved by the agency.106  By including that
stipulation, the Home Concrete Court unnecessarily added more com-
plication to an already complex Chevron analysis.107
III. UNITED STATES v. HOME CONCRETE & SUPPLY, LLC
During the 1990s, before the IRS released Notice 2000-44, partner-
ships often took advantage of Son of BOSS tax shelters to avoid fed-
eral tax obligations on capital gains from the sale of a business or
other appreciated assets.108  One such Son of BOSS shelter involves
transferring capital assets into a partnership to increase the basis in
the partnership.109  After the asset has lost value, the taxpayer then
sells the partnership or the asset, reporting a loss on the sale.110  Ste-
phen R. Chandler and Robert L. Pierce carried out a similar transac-
tion in Home Concrete & Supply, LLC. v. United States.111
101. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 982.
104. Id. (citing Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996)).
105. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1842 (2012).
106. Id. at 1847 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
107. See infra section IV.B.
108. John D. McKinnon, IRS Loses Tax-Shelter Case, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2012,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230399060457736631
2132335038.html.
109. See Home Concrete & Supply, LLC. v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 2d 678, 681–82
(E.D.N.C. 2008), rev’d, 634 F.3d, 249 (4th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
110. See id.
111. Id.
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A. The Facts
Home Concrete & Supply, LLC was a limited liability company
formed on April 15, 1999, as a pass-through entity for tax purposes.112
The sole shareholders were Pierce, Chandler, and a corporation they
owned called Home Oil and Coal Company, Inc.113  Pierce indicated to
his accountants, Arthur Andersen LLP (Andersen) and Jenkens & Gil-
christ, P.C. (Jenkens), that he was interested in selling his share in
Home Oil, and they counseled Pierce and Chandler to form Home Con-
crete as a means of avoiding difficult federal tax obligations on capital
gains from the sale of the business interest.114
After forming the LLC, Chandler, Pierce, and Home Oil initiated
short sales of United States Treasury Bonds on May 13, 1999.115  A
short sale involves “the sale of a security that the seller does not own
or has not contracted for at the time of sale, and that the seller must
borrow to make delivery.”116  With regard to the U.S. Treasury Bonds,
the parties in Home Concrete received proceeds of $7,472,405, which
they transferred into Home Concrete as capital contributions.117  By
transferring the funds into Home Concrete, the capital contributions
created “outside basis”118 equal to the amount of contributions.119  On
May 18, 1999, Home Concrete closed the short sales by returning iden-
tical bonds that it purchased for $7,359,043.120  Up to this point, the
taxpayers had not done anything that would have alerted the Com-
missioner of a Son of BOSS transaction.
However, on June 11, 1999, and over the following week, Home Oil
transferred its assets to Home Concrete in return for Chandler and
Pierce’s partnership interests in Home Concrete.121  This essentially
provided Home Oil with a large outside basis as a result of the previ-
112. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir.
2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).  Jenkens and Gilchrist, the accounting firm
under which Anderson LLP and Jenkens operated, closed while Home Concrete
moved through the appeals process.  Patrick Temple, “Son of Boss” Crackdown
Lands in Supreme Court, REUTERS, Jan. 13, 2012, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/2012/01/13/us-usa-tax-court-idUSTRE80C1UC20120113.
Two of the firm’s partners were found guilty of tax fraud. Id.
113. Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 251.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1456 (9th ed. 2009). See Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at
251 n.1.
117. Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 251.
118. Outside basis represents a partner’s basis in the partnership itself.  Whereas, the
inside basis represents the partnership’s basis in the assets in the partnership.
See, e.g., Sally Anne James, Comment, Partnership Basis Adjustments and Allo-
cations Following a Section 708 Deemed Liquidation and Recontribution, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1905, 1905 (1987).
119. Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 251.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 252.
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ous short sale and previous partnership interests once held by the tax-
payers, while leaving Home Concrete with assets it could sell.  The
partners sold Home Concrete’s assets to a third-party purchaser on
August 31, 1999, for $10,623,348, but on their April 2000 tax return,
they only reported a gain of $69,125.08 from the sale.122  They man-
aged to achieve such a small amount of gain by electing to “step up”
Home Concrete’s “inside basis under 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C.) § 754 to equal
the taxpayers’ outside bases.”123
B. District and Appellate Court Proceedings
The IRS began looking into the transaction after it issued a sum-
mons to Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C. on June 19, 2003.124  After the in-
vestigation, the IRS issued a Final Partnership Administrative
Adjustment (FPAA) on September 7, 2006, which essentially retroac-
tively decreased the partners’ outside bases in Home Concrete to zero
at the time the assets were sold.125  The IRS reasoned first that the
partners formed Home Concrete as a sham to avoid federal taxes on
capital gains and second that the shifting of partnership interests and
assets between Home Oil and Home Concrete lacked economic sub-
stance.126  To avoid further penalties, Home Concrete deposited
$1,392,118 with the IRS and filed suit pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 6226(e)(1)
and 6501 against the Commissioner in district court to recover that
amount.127
Chandler, Pierce, their wives, and Home Oil (Plaintiffs) alleged the
FPAA was time barred by the three-year statute of limitations under
§§ 6229128 and 6501.129  In response, the IRS argued that a six-year
statute of limitations applied pursuant to § 6501(e)(1)(A) because the
plaintiffs “omitted” more than 25 percent of their income from their
tax return.130  Plaintiffs made a motion for judgment on the pleadings
and the IRS made a motion for partial summary judgment, both of
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 743(b)(1) (West 2004)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. See also Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (providing the framework
for the economic substance doctrine requiring transactions to have a purpose be-
sides tax evasion in order for the IRS to recognize them as legitimate
transactions).
127. Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 252–53. See Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United
States, 599 F. Supp. 2d 678, 680 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
128. Section 6229(c)(2) includes virtually identical language to § 6501 but directs its
language more specifically to partnerships.  I.R.C. § 6229(c)(2) (1983) (“If any
partnership omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein
which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in its return,
subsection (a) shall be applied by substituting ‘6 years’ for ‘3 years.’”)
129. Home Concrete, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 680.
130. Id.
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which were denied.131  The district court thereafter permitted limited
discovery, and plaintiffs subsequently made a new motion for sum-
mary judgment, while the IRS countered with its own motion for par-
tial summary judgment.132
In holding for the IRS, the district court first determined Colony
did not apply and that an increase in basis like the one performed by
plaintiffs was considered an omission of income.133  In reaching that
decision the district court first looked at the language of § 6501 and
the statute interpreted in Colony, § 275(c).134  The court reasoned that
by adding subsection (i), Congress exempted trades or businesses from
the six-year statute of limitations in § 6501(e)(1)(A).135  The district
court concluded Congress’s purpose behind adding the subsection was
not to be redundant, but instead, to include an exception for trades or
businesses because of the likelihood they might make an accidental
accounting mistake.136
After the district court determined that the taxpayers had in fact
omitted over 25 percent of their income from the return and that the
six-year statute of limitations applied, it then looked to whether the
taxpayers’ omission was nonetheless exempted under § 6501(e)
(1)(B)(ii).137  Section 6501(e)(1)(B)(ii) states that income that is ade-
quately disclosed is not included in the calculation of omitted gross
income.138  After the district court asked the parties to prepare a brief
regarding the issue of adequate disclosure, the court held in favor of
the IRS, saying not only that the six-year statute of limitations ap-
plied, but also that plaintiffs were not exempted from their omissions
under § 6501(e)(1)(B)(ii) because they did not “disclose the substance
of the transaction that created the overstatement.”139
On appeal, plaintiffs again argued that they did not omit an
amount equaling more than 25 percent of their gross income.140  They
further argued that, even if they had omitted over 25 percent of their
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 684–85.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 680. “The Colony Court’s declaration that section 275(c) is ‘limited to situa-
tions in which specific receipts or accruals of income items are left out of the
computation of gross income’ makes eminent sense because The Colony, Inc. was
a trade or business selling goods or services.” Id. at 685 (quoting Salman Ranch,
Ltd. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 189 (2007)).
137. Id. at 688–90.
138. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(B)(ii) (1954).
139. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, No. 7:06-CV-181-FL, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 127250, at *21 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 9, 2009), rev’d, 634 F.3d 249 (4th Cir.
2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
140. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 253 (4th Cir.
2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
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gross income, the omission was exempted because they disclosed the
amount in the return adequately enough to alert the Commissioner of
the omission.141  During the pendency of the appeal, the IRS created
another issue for the court to resolve by promulgating a temporary
regulation on September 28, 2009.142  This temporary regulation es-
sentially interpreted § 6501 in favor of the IRS’s position, and the IRS
claimed it applied retroactively to the plaintiffs’ case.143
The Fourth Circuit first reversed the district court by holding that
“Colony forecloses the argument that Home Concrete’s overstated ba-
sis in its reporting of the short sale proceeds resulted in an omission
from its reported gross income.”144  The court first determined that
Colony should apply, despite the fact that the Colony transaction in-
volved a trade or business and the Home Concrete transaction did
not.145  The court determined the regulations did not warrant Chev-
ron deference because the Supreme Court already determined § 6501
was unambiguous and Congress left no room for the Treasury to inter-
pret it.146  Further, the court reasoned the regulations should not ap-
ply because they would essentially overturn the Supreme Court’s
interpretation in Colony.147
C. Home Concrete Reaches the Supreme Court
The IRS appealed the Fourth Circuit’s decision and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.148  The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed
the Fourth Circuit’s opinion and held that Congress did not grant the
IRS the authority to interpret § 6501 any further than the statute it-
self and Colony already had.149  At the time the Supreme Court de-
cided to review the case, there were at least thirty other companies
similar to Home Concrete that were waiting to learn if the IRS could
be successful in suits that arise more than three years after they filed
their returns.150  The Supreme Court’s ruling effectively eliminated
141. Id.
142. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-1T(a)(1)(iii) (2010).
143. Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 255–56.  The regulation promulgated by the IRS
stated that “an understated amount of gross income resulting from an overstate-
ment of unrecovered cost or other basis constitutes an omission from gross in-
come for purposes of section 6501(e)(1)(A)(i).”  Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-
1T(a)(1)(iii).
144. Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 255.
145. Id. at 255–57.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 257.
148. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
149. Id.
150. Patrick Temple-West, Supreme Court Restrains IRS in Tax Shelter Case, CHI.
TRIB. (Apr. 25, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-25/news/sns-rt-
us-usa-tax-supreme-courtbre83o119-20120425_1_tax-shelter-case-son-of-boss-
tax-irs.
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the government’s chances of collecting the over one billion dollars
withheld by those thirty companies.151
In reaching its decision, the majority first analyzed the plain lan-
guage and legislative history behind §§ 275(c) and 6501.152  In analyz-
ing the plain language of the statutes, the Court indicated that
Congress clearly did not intend an increase of basis to be considered
an omission.153  It reasoned that if Congress had wanted the inflation
of basis to be included under § 6501, it would have used words such as
“reduces” or “understates,” instead of “omits,” to indicate something
other than “ ‘[t]o leave out or unmention[ ].’ ”154  The Court further
noted that congressional reports discussing the statute indicated Con-
gress “merely had in mind failures to report particular income receipts
and accruals, and did not intend the [extended] limitation to apply
whenever gross income was understated.”155
The Supreme Court then responded to concerns raised by the IRS,
namely that Congress may have been redundant in providing for cases
such as Colony in the operative paragraph of § 6501 and providing the
same protection in § 6501(e)(1)(B)(i).156  The Court first explained
that Congress might have retained both clauses because it wanted to
ensure that the decision in Uptegrove Lumber Co. v. Commissioner
that did not include trade or business transactions in the definition of
omission would remain the law.157  Congress enacted § 6501 in 1954
and could not have known that a case such as Colony would come up
shortly thereafter, in 1958.  The Supreme Court also explained that,
in addition to protecting trade or business transactions, § 6501 also
provides the framework for calculating gross income.158
Finally, the majority looked at whether it should grant deference to
the IRS regarding Treasury Regulation § 301.6501(e)-1.159  The Court
determined first that Colony already interpreted the statute160 and
next that Congress had never granted the IRS the authority to fill any
151. Id.
152. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1839–41.
153. Id. at 1840 (“ ‘Congress intended an exception to the usual three-year statute of
limitations only in the restricted type of situation already described,’ a situation
that did not include overstatements of basis.”).
154. Id. (quoting Colony, Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28, 32 (1958)).
155. Id. (citing Colony, Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28, 35 (1958)).
156. Id. at 1850.
157. Id. at 1841. See also Uptegrove Lumber Co. v. Comm’r, 204 F.2d 570 (3d Cir.
1953) (holding that because there is a good chance for taxpayers in the trade or
business context to make arithmetic errors, there should be an exemption al-
lowed under § 275(c) for those taxpayers). But see Reis v. Comm’r, 142 F.2d 900
(6th Cir. 1944) (applying the five-year statute of limitations to a business case).
158. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1842.
159. Id. at 1842–44.
160. Id. at 1843.
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gaps in § 6501 because of the unambiguous language of the statute.161
Because the Court had already interpreted § 6501 in Colony, it rea-
soned that granting deference to a Treasury Regulation, which effec-
tively overruled the Colony decision, would oppose the “principles of
stare decisis.”162  Justice Scalia expanded on the majority’s decision in
his concurrence by explaining that, although he agreed with the ma-
jority’s outcome, they should distance themselves from the holding in
Brand X and instead hold that “[o]nce a court has decided upon its de
novo construction of the statute, there no longer is a different con-
struction that is consistent with the court’s holding and available for
adoption by the agency.”163
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Ka-
gan, dissented.164  The dissent opined that the Court should have
granted deference to the IRS regarding its regulations because the
Colony Court never interpreted the amendments to § 275(c) that
showed up in § 6501.165  Further, the dissent argued for a different
interpretation of the Uptegrove decision than did the majority.166  The
dissent argued Congress may have included the § 6501(e)(1)(B)(i) lan-
guage about trades or businesses to solidify its stance that any over-
statement of basis should be considered an omission outside of that
small trade or business context.167  Finally, the dissent cited Brand X
for support that an agency can issue its own interpretation of a statute
even if the Court has already interpreted a statute created by
Congress.168
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court in Home Concrete mistakenly relied on Colony as prece-
dent for a case involving § 6501.  Besides the fact that § 6501 contains
a number of amendments made by Congress in 1954 to the original
§ 275(c),169 there are other reasons the Court should not have relied
on Colony as precedent.  This Part addresses why the Court should
161. Id.  “The fact that a statute is unambiguous means that there is ‘no gap for the
agency to fill’ and thus ‘no room for agency discretion.’” Id. (citing Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005)).
162. Id. at 1844.
163. Id. at 1846 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1017 n.12 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
164. Id. at 1849.
165. Id. at 1850 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 1849.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1851–52 (“[J]udicial construction of an ambiguous statute [does] not fore-
close an agency’s later, inconsistent interpretation of the same provision.”) (citing
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83
(2005)).
169. See supra section II.B.
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not have relied on Colony in making its decision in Home Concrete and
further explains why the Court should have relied on Treasury Regu-
lation § 301.6501(e)-1.
A. The Home Concrete Court Should Not Have Relied on
Colony as Precedent
1. Son of BOSS Transactions Are Still Considered Omissions
From Gross Income Under § 275(c)
Courts that have relied on Colony for Son of BOSS transactions
after Congress enacted § 6501 focus on Justice Harlan’s reference to
§ 6501 at the end of the decision: “[T]he conclusion we reach is in har-
mony with the unambiguous language of § 6501(e)(1)(A) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954.”170  The reliance courts place on Justice
Harlan’s statement is misplaced and ignores the legislative history be-
hind §§ 6501(e)(1)(A) and 275(c).  Rather, Justice Harlan was likely
referring to the two subsections in § 6501(e)(1)(A) granting exceptions
to certain businesses and taxpayers who disclose omitted items on
their returns.
By looking at the legislative intent behind § 275(c), it becomes
clear that Congress has been concerned since as early as 1934 with
transactions such as Son of BOSS that have no economic substance
and constitute an omission of a large amount of gross income from a
return.  Before enacting § 275(c) in 1934, Congress was interested in
extending the three-year limitation to five years to assess tax returns
of taxpayers who omitted more than 25 percent of their income from
their returns.171  Congress noted that prior to 1934 the IRS was per-
mitted to assess the tax without regard to the statute of limitations in
the case of a failure to file a return or in the case of a fraudulent re-
turn.172  Extending the statute of limitations to curb abuses amount-
ing to large amounts of income was a natural extension of that
previous law.173  Members of Congress also noted that extending the
limitations period might prove unfair to taxpayers who make an “hon-
est mistake” in filing a tax return.174 Colony clarified that an “honest
170. Colony v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28, 37 (1958). See Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d
347, 352–53 (5th Cir. 2011); Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Comm’r, 568
F.3d 767, 778 (9th Cir. 2009); Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d
1362, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Comm’r, 128 T.C.
207, 212–13 (2007).
171. H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 35 (1934), reprinted in J. S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS, 1938-1861, at 390 (2003).
172. Id.
173. Id.  Note that Congress used the word “amount” as opposed to “item,” alluding to
Congress’s intent to extend the statute of limitations when an amount over 25
percent of gross income is not included in a tax return. Id.
174. J. S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS,
1938-1861, at 391 (2003) (statement of Samuel B. Hill).
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mistake” might include “errors in . . . computation,” such as the mis-
calculation of cost of goods sold.175  Finally, Congress hoped to make
the Commissioner aware of possible abusive transactions that lacked
economic substance.176  In fact, Colony based its decision on that
premise.177
Unfortunately, Congress failed to codify all of its concerns in
§ 275(c).  After the statute was adopted, courts began to question its
application.178  For example, shortly before Congress amended
§ 275(c), the Supreme Court looked at whether the five-year statute of
limitations should apply to a taxpayer who improperly calculated his
cost of goods sold.179  The IRS, with support from the tax court, ar-
gued “the language ‘omits from gross income any amount properly in-
cludible therein’ should be construed broadly” to include any
understatement of gross income.180  The taxpayer argued that
§ 275(c) should only apply when an individual leaves an “item” off the
return.181  The Court ultimately sided with the taxpayer,182 which
satisfied Congress’s concern about prosecuting a taxpayer who makes
an “honest mistake” on a return in a trade or business context.183
Perhaps to ensure future courts followed the decision in Uptegrove,
Congress included subsections (i) and (ii) in § 6501(e)(1)(A).184  These
new sections essentially limit Uptegrove’s favorable decision for the
taxpayer to misstatements of basis in the trade or business context.185
Subsection (i) provides an exception to § 6501(e)(1)(A) that allows
trades or businesses to calculate their “gross income” by looking at the
amount received from the sale of goods or services before subtracting
the cost of goods sold.186  This was a logical means of protecting trades
and businesses involved in calculating inventory costs.  Justice Ken-
nedy noted that there are “unique complexities involved in calculating
inventory costs,” making it unfair to extend the statute of limitations
175. Colony, 357 U.S. at 33.
176. Statute of Limitations, Assessment and Collection of Taxes and Penalties: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 83d Cong. 1354 (1953) (statement of
H. Ober Hess, Chairman, Fed. Tax Comm., Taxation Section, Pa. Bar Ass’n).
177. Colony, 357 U.S. at 36 (“Congress manifested no broader purpose than to give the
Commissioner an additional two years to investigate tax returns in cases where,
because of a taxpayer’s omission to report some taxable item, the Commissioner
is at a special disadvantage in detecting errors.”).
178. See supra section II.A.
179. Uptegrove Lumber Co. v. Comm’r, 204 F.2d 570, 571 (3d. Cir. 1953).
180. Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 275(c) (1934)).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 573.
183. Id.
184. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1850 (2012)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
185. Id.
186. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) (1958).
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period for a mistake in calculation at these firms.187  In fact, although
§ 275(c) did not expressly grant a business exception, as § 6501 does,
Colony reached its decision by looking at legislative history showing
that Congress intended for these difficult business calculations to be
exempt.188
Congress also provided for its concern that the IRS should have
enough time to investigate improper returns that are not improper on
their face.  Congress granted the IRS six years to prosecute taxpayers
who improperly show a high basis on their returns.189  To provide an
escape for taxpayers who knowingly but not improperly increase their
bases, Congress also granted an exception to the six-year statute of
limitations period for taxpayers who disclose specific amounts on their
returns that lead to an inflated basis.190
By granting these special exceptions in § 6501, Congress did not
limit the reach of the statute’s main operative clause.  The legislative
history indicates that when Congress passed § 6501, it was still con-
cerned about taxpayers failing to report over 25 percent of their in-
come.191  Further, the fact that the circuit courts were having to
correct the tax court and district courts,192 made it more important for
Congress to clarify that it intended § 6501 to grant the IRS extra time
to prosecute taxpayers who were failing to report income.
2. Congress’s Intent to Prosecute Son of BOSS Transactions
After Three Years Is Clear
Not only does the legislative history behind §§ 275(c) and 6501 in-
dicate that Congress intended for inflation of basis to fall under the
definition of “omission of an amount from gross income,”193 but the
language from § 6501 shows that intent, as well.  In addition to pro-
viding two new subsections to § 275(c), Congress also extended the
length of the statute of limitations from five to six years.194  At the
time § 6501 was passed, the statute of limitations for many criminal
offenses was five years.195  To extend the statute of limitations longer
187. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1850 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing O. WHITTING-
TON & K. PANY, PRINCIPLES OF AUDITING AND OTHER ASSURANCE SERVICES 488
(15th ed. 2006)).
188. See Colony v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28, 34 (1958).
189. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii)(II).
190. Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
191. H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, supra note 171, at 390.
192. See, e.g., Uptegrove Lumber Co. v. Comm’r, 204 F.2d 570 (3d. Cir.1953); Reis v.
Comm’r, 142 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1944).
193. See supra subsection IV.A.1.
194. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii)(II).
195. Statute of Limitations, Assessment and Collection of Taxes and Penalties: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. On Ways and Means, 83d Cong. 1347 (1953) (statement of
Clarence O. Schlegel, Secretary-Treasurer, Reliable Bldg. & Loan Assoc., Clay
City, Ind.).
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than three years for the IRS to review tax returns indicates Congress
felt there was something more serious than accounting mistakes going
on—something that needed to be stopped.196  Most courts that re-
search the legislative history behind §§ 6501 and 275(c) posit Con-
gress was concerned about prosecuting taxpayers for transactions that
lack economic substance.197
The term “economic substance” refers to “an objective and subjec-
tive determination of whether a transaction has real, non-tax eco-
nomic benefit.”198  The fact that a transaction is solely tax-motivated
does not necessarily mean that it lacks economic substance;199 how-
ever, a Son of BOSS transaction is normally both solely tax-motivated
and lacking in economic substance.200  Indeed, the taxpayer in Home
Concrete did not even know he wanted to create a new entity and
transfer assets until after he talked to his accountants about his de-
sire to sell his share in the Home Concrete partnership.201  The trans-
action in Home Concrete lacked economic substance and was exactly
the type of transaction Congress was trying to prevent by its initial
enactment of § 275(c) and its subsequent modifications to it in § 6501.
Perhaps more importantly than extending the statute of limita-
tions by a year, Congress purposefully did not change the phrase
“omits from gross income an amount” to “omits from gross income an
item.”202  At the same time that Congress chose the word “amount” for
the operative clause of § 6501, it used the word “item” in another
clause of the same statute.203  In § 6501(e)(2), Congress allowed for an
extended limitations period in cases where taxpayers left omitted
“items” from an estate or gift tax return.204  Congress’s decision to use
“amount” as opposed to “item” in the operative clause supports the
idea that Congress was not solely concerned about a taxpayer leaving
an item off of his or her tax return.  Instead, “amount” captures any
transaction that affects the amount of gross income reported on the
196. See id.
197. See, e.g., Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (“Transactions that are economically meaningless in the context for which
tax benefits are claimed are not, by virtue of the Court’s holding in Colony, vali-
dated by simply designating the costs as ‘basis’ for unrelated property.” (citing
Kornman & Assocs. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443, 456, 462 (5th Cir. 2008))).
198. Yoram Keinan, The Many Faces of the Economic Substance’s Two-Prong Test:
Time for Reconciliation?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 371, 372 (2005) (citing David P.
Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235 (1999)).
199. Id.
200. Salman Ranch, 573 F.3d at 1382.
201. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir.
2011), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
202. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
203. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(2) (1958).
204. Id.
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return.  Inflating basis can diminish the amount of gain from a trans-
action, just like omitting an item can do.
B. Courts Should Grant Deference to Treasury Regulation
§ 301.6501
1. The Operative Language in §§ 275(c) and 6501 Is Ambiguous,
and the IRS Provided a Permissible Construction of
These Regulations
Even if a court concludes it is unclear whether Congress intended
Son of BOSS transactions to fall within the operative language of
§ 6501, the Home Concrete decision improperly precludes that court
from applying Treasury Regulation § 301.6501 to Son of BOSS cases.
The Supreme Court in Chevron provided a two-step method for deter-
mining whether a court should grant deference to an agency regula-
tion over a court decision.205  First, a court must ask “whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.206  If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.”207  If Con-
gress’s intent is not clear or the statute is ambiguous, it can be in-
ferred that Congress granted interpretive authority to an agency.208
If Congress granted interpretive authority, a court then proceeds to
Chevron’s second step, which asks “whether the agency’s answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.”209
The Court incorrectly applied Chevron to its decision in Home Con-
crete.  Arguably, Congress’s intent behind §§ 275(c) and 6501 was
fairly clear.210  However, courts split regarding how broadly the oper-
ative clause in those statutes should be interpreted.211  This supports
the idea that there was at least some ambiguity in the statutes that
Congress had left open for the IRS to interpret.  Indeed, the Court in
Colony even admitted that § 275(c) was ambiguous.212
Because § 275(c) was ambiguous, Chevron should have required
the Home Concrete Court proceed to step two and determine “whether
the agency’s answer [was] based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”213  Had the Court deferred to the IRS regulation, it likely
would have held the IRS’s interpretation of §§ 6501 and 275(c) was
205. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 843.
210. See infra section IV.A.
211. See supra section II.A.
212. Colony v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28, 33 (1958) (“[I]t cannot be said that the language is
unambiguous.”).
213. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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reasonable.214  Indeed, as noted above, the legislative history clearly
suggests Congress wanted to include an overstatement of basis within
the statute’s scope.215  However, instead of asking whether the IRS
regulation was a permissible construction of the statute, the Court in
Home Concrete improperly never moved on to Chevron’s second step.
2. Home Concrete Decision Further Complicates Chevron
Analysis
To avoid passing to Chevron’s second step, the Court determined
that, in addition to Chevron, the Brand X test should apply to cases
that occurred before Chevron was decided.216  The Brand X test allows
a judicial construction of a statute to trump an agency’s interpretation
“otherwise entitled to Chevron deference [o]nly if the prior court deci-
sion holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of
the statute.”217  Even though Justice Harlan indicated that the stat-
ute was ambiguous, the Home Concrete Court still determined that
the Colony decision was derived from the unambiguous terms of the
statute.218  The Court in Home Concrete reasoned that Courts such as
Colony “had no inkling that [they] must utter the magic words ‘ambig-
uous’ or ‘unambiguous’” and therefore, decisions to move to Chevron
step two should not be based on whether the Court uses those
words.219
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Home Concrete suggests that
the majority’s opinion fails to harmonize the Brand X and Colony deci-
sions.220  Indeed, by relying on both Chevron and Brand X as prece-
dent, the Court requires future courts to assume that ambiguities in
pre-Chevron statutes do not equate to Congress delegating gap-filling
authority to agencies, while a finding of ambiguity in post-Chevron
statutes automatically means Congress delegated gap-filling author-
ity to agencies.221  Under Home Concrete, to determine if Congress did
grant authority to an agency to interpret a pre-Chevron ambiguous
statute, not only does a court need to find that the statute is ambigu-
ous, but the court must also determine whether “Congress wanted the
particular ambiguity in question to be resolved by the agency.”222
214. Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail v. Comm’r, 650 F.3d 691, 705–06 (D.C. Cir.
2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012).
215. See supra section IV.A.
216. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1846 (2012)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
217. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982
(2005) (emphasis added).
218. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1846 (Scalia, J., concurring).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1846–48.
221. Id. at 1847.
222. Id.
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The question Chevron requires courts to ask is not whether Con-
gress wanted a particular ambiguity in a statute resolved by an
agency, but whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is a per-
missible construction.223  To solve the problem Home Concrete had in
relying on both Colony and Brand X, the Court had two different op-
tions.  First, the Court could have determined that Harlan’s reference
to § 6501 as unambiguous and § 275(c) as ambiguous only referred to
the ambiguity in the statutes with regard to trades or businesses.  In-
deed, Colony itself can be considered a business transaction case.  In
Colony, the taxpayer’s miscalculation of the basis in his land resulted
in a deficiency in the amount of income he reported on his return.224
Home Concrete, on the other hand, involved a complex Son of BOSS
transaction.225  The ambiguity regarding trades or businesses and
miscalculations of costs of goods sold was an ambiguity that was re-
solved by Colony.  The question of whether a Son of BOSS transaction
specifically should be considered an omission from gross income was
an ambiguity that Colony did not necessarily answer for either
§ 275(c) or § 6501.
The second option the Court had in Home Concrete was to overrule
Brand X and grant deference to courts like Colony that interpret a
statute before an agency has the opportunity.226  Scalia argues that by
distancing itself from Brand X, the Court would make the application
of Chevron to pre-Chevron statutes more clear.227  By overruling
Brand X, “there no longer [would be] a different construction [of a
statute] available for adoption by [an] agency” after a court like Col-
ony interprets an ambiguity.228
Ultimately, the Home Concrete Court acquiesced that § 275(c) was
ambiguous with regard to the question of whether an inflated basis
constitutes an omission from gross income.229  A strict interpretation
of Chevron would have required the Court to grant deference to the
IRS regulations.  Even if the Court chose not to grant deference to the
regulations with regard to § 275(c), the Court should have granted
deference because the regulations interpreted ambiguities involved in
§ 6501, which the Court did not directly interpret in Colony and which
was the actual statute at issue in Home Concrete.
223. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
224. Colony v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28, 30 (1958).
225. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1836.
226. Id. at 1848 (Scalia, J., concurring).
227. Id. at 1846–48.
228. Id. at 1846.
229. Id. at 1840; Colony, Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28, 33 (1958).
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V. CONCLUSION
Since Congress first introduced § 275(c) into the Internal Revenue
Code in 1934, courts have struggled to find the meaning behind the
language “omits from gross income an amount.”230  However, Con-
gress has always made it clear that its purpose behind the statute was
to give the IRS more time to prosecute taxpayers who omit large
amounts of income from their tax returns by carrying out transactions
with no economic substance.231  In searching for taxpayers who vio-
lated § 275(c), Congress also noted that the IRS should be careful not
to prosecute taxpayers who mistakenly over calculate the cost of goods
sold in business transactions.232  Modern courts like the Home Con-
crete Court mistakenly believe that Colony involved a transaction sim-
ilar to a Son of BOSS transaction.  This has led many courts to rely on
Colony as if it is the immortalization of the 1934 and 1954 Congress’s
mind in creating § 275(c) and § 6501.
Relying on Colony for Son of BOSS cases is similar to Hobbs bat-
ting with his broken “Wonderboy” bat. Colony was helpful in illustrat-
ing the exception that Congress intended for businesses and trades in
§ 275(c).  However, the Colony Court never interpreted the statute ap-
plicable to the current § 6501.  Because § 6501 was somewhat ambigu-
ous with regard to the question of whether Son of BOSS transactions
constitute an omission of gross income, the Home Concrete Court
should have relied on the IRS’s interpretation of the statute.  Indeed,
Chevron required that the Court rely on the IRS’s interpretation.233
Instead, the Home Concrete Court muddied the waters for future
courts by creating new steps to follow in determining whether an
agency should be granted deference in its regulations.  Had the Court
instead relied on its batboy and his “Savoy Special,” the IRS and its
regulation, courts would have a clearer idea of which transactions con-
stitute omissions from gross income and when to grant deference to
IRS regulations enacted during pending litigation.
230. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) (1954).
231. See supra section IV.A.
232. See supra section IV.A.
233. See supra section IV.B.
